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Unlike many other major petroleum exporting 
countries, the drop in oil prices since mid-2014 has 
affected the Iranian economy modestly, at least in 
comparison to the international sanctions regime in 
place against Tehran. The sanctions regime imposed 
against Iran three years ago created the sort of  massive 
shock for the Iranian economy that is being faced now 
by other oil-producing states. The oil price drop was, 
therefore, a second, lesser issue for Iran that—for all 
of  its effects—is less of  a fundamental problem for the 
Iranian economy than the sanctions imposed against it. 
Iran’s limited access to the revenue from its oil sales 
since February 2013 acted, in effect, like a major price 
reduction. Under US sanctions, banks holding Iran’s 
oil revenues in China, India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
and Turkey have prevented these revenues from being 
used or transferred, other than in support of  bilateral 
trade or for the purchase of  humanitarian goods. This 
situation has not improved through P5+1 (China, 
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) and Iran’s Joint Plan of  Action (JPOA), 
under which Iran only has access to $700 million of  
its oil revenues held abroad per month. Iran’s imports 
have  shifted to favor its remaining oil customers but 
still has not equaled the amount of  money that Iran 
has earned through oil sales to them. The result has 
been an accretion of  revenues in restricted accounts in 
those six customers’ banks and a requirement for Iran 
to plan as if  these revenues are largely inaccessible. 
In response to this first fundamental shock, Iran has 
already begun undertaking the appropriate policy 
response. First, Iranians elected Hassan Rouhani to 
the presidency in June 2013, in part in response to his 
campaign promises to right the Iranian economic ship. 
Through his election, a coterie of  technocrats—last 
in office under President Khatami (1997–2005)—has 
returned to power in Tehran, bringing with them a 
more rational economic approach and policies. This 
has included but is not limited to efforts to change 
the manner in which Iran spends national revenue, 
reduce Iran’s dependence on the availability of  oil 
revenues, and address problems of  government-related 
corruption. Given vastly improved management over 
the last administration, Rouhani’s government is 
consistently posting better numbers regarding inflation 
and economic growth, although job creation and 
unemployment reduction remain more difficult hurdles 
to overcome. 
The authors conclude that President Rouhani’s long-
term plans for Iran’s economy, however, hinge on 
sanctions being removed. Iran could benefit from 
diversifying away from dependence on oil for export 
revenue, but sanctions have also limited Iran’s ability to 
obtain support and materiel necessary to create viable, 
nonoil export sectors. If  sanctions were to remain in 
place, Iran could benefit from higher oil prices and 
from changing its approach to domestic fuel subsidies 
to permit the government to collect revenues from 
internal consumption. But without sanctions relief, 
Iran will not be able to achieve its goals of  increasing 
employment and bringing inflation down further 
and bringing the country’s overall growth trajectory 
closer to its potential. Sanctions simply create too 
many problems and impair Iran’s ability to undertake 
policy adjustments to address its broader economic 
challenges.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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INTRODUCTION
Distortions are present in the oil industries of  many 
major petroleum exporting countries. However, perhaps 
no other country has as many different factors at play 
in its oil sector as Iran. Even prior to the imposition 
of  international sanctions against it, Iran managed 
its oil production in different ways than others and in 
response to a complex history of  foreign concessions, 
nationalization, and, ultimately, popular uprising. With 
international sanctions, Iran’s oil sector operates under 
constraints that make it even more difficult to discern 
precisely what will happen in response to individual 
stimuli and, in particular, what the implications would be 
of  a major, sustained reduction in oil prices. Moreover, 
with international sanctions presently the subject of  
negotiations between Iran and members of  the P5+1 
(China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States), it is possible that these sanctions 
might soon be modified, reduced, or terminated 
altogether.
Taking these various factors into account, this assessment 
has formed the following conclusions about Iran’s oil 
economy under a low-price scenario:
•   Although a drop in oil prices naturally affects Iran 
like any other oil supplier, the effects are distorted 
by virtue of  the international sanctions regime in 
place against it.
•   The decline in Iran’s oil exports, as well as its limited 
access to the revenue of  its oil sales since 2012, 
have, in effect, acted like a major price reduction 
in terms of  Iran’s near-term ability to utilize its oil 
revenues. For example, imports in 2014 were down 
by 23 percent compared to 2012. As such, Iran 
experienced the oil-price shock that is only now 
being confronted by other oil producers as early as 
three years ago.
o   Under P5+1 and Iran’s Joint Plan of  Action 
(JPOA), Iran only has access to $700 million 
per month of  its oil revenues held abroad.
o   Under US sanctions, and with the exception 
of  the aforementioned $700 million, banks 
holding Iran’s oil revenues in China, India, 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey have 
prevented these revenues from being used or 
transferred, other than in support of  bilateral 
trade or for the purchase of  humanitarian 
goods.
o   Iran’s imports have shifted to favor its six 
remaining oil customers but still has not 
equaled the amount of  money that Iran has 
earned through oil sales to them. Over time, a 
sustained, major reduction in oil prices would 
undermine Iran’s ability to engage in even this 
trade, but this would take time to manifest. 
•   Iran has already responded to the loss in access to 
oil revenue by electing Rouhani to the presidency 
in June 2013, thus restoring to power a competent 
assemblage of  experts and technocrats. It has also 
responded by changing its budgeting to reduce 
dependence on the availability of  oil revenues. 
•   President Rouhani’s long-term plans for Iran’s 
economy, however, hinge on sanctions being 
removed. Oil price will be a factor, and a recovery 
in oil prices could enable Iran to reform still further 
its damaged economy, but sanctions relief  remains 
the main driver for Iran’s economic future.
This paper begins by reviewing the history of  Iran’s 
oil industry and the impact that sanctions have had on 
it to date. The paper then describes the steps taken by 
President Rouhani since his election to reform the 
Iranian economy. The paper concludes by providing 
an assessment of  what the future looks like for Iran’s 
economy, both in the context of  a deal that removes 
sanctions and given the possibility of  future moves in the 
price of  oil.
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Oil, natural gas, and related products have been at the 
center of  Iran’s economy and development, as well as its 
political life, since oil was first discovered there in 1908. 
Prior to World War II, Iran was a critical link in the British 
Empire’s supply chain in Asia, providing the fuel needed 
to support the British army and navy in their operations 
in India and Southeast Asia. The importance of  Iran to 
Allied war efforts was underscored when British and 
Soviet forces occupied Iran at the start of  World War II. 
Following World War II, the British continued to play a 
significant role in the development of  Iran’s oil and gas 
sector. However, growing dissatisfaction in Iran, linked 
to the unequal distribution of  the profits from the sale 
of  Iranian oil, resulted in the Iranian Majles’s decision to 
nationalize Iran’s oil industry in 1951. This decision was 
effectively reversed in 1953, following the coup against 
Prime Minister Mossadegh, when foreign companies 
were permitted to, once again, play a role in Iran’s oil 
extraction. In 1979, during the Iranian Revolution, the oil 
industry was again nationalized by the new government. 
Since that time, the Iranian constitution has prohibited 
foreign concessions of  any Iranian natural resource, 
and the sale of  oil is controlled exclusively by the 
Iranian government.
Oil has remained the essential economic sector of  the 
Islamic Republic of  Iran. However, Iran has been unable 
to replicate the production levels it enjoyed prior to the 
revolution, which reached as high as 6 million barrels per 
day (bpd) in the late 1970s, in large part due to the absence 
of  sustained foreign technical support, unattractive 
economic policies (especially the “buyback” contracts 
that were considered commercially unappealing to 
international investors), political instability immediately 
following the revolution, and the damage that resulted 
from the war with Iraq in the 1980s. 
As Figure 1 shows, Iran was able to achieve some 
recovery following the end of  the war with Iraq and 
throughout the 1990s with the reforms undertaken by 
then-president Rafsanjani that loosened restrictions on 
foreign access to and profits from Iran’s oil industry. Still, 
relatively low oil prices in the 1990s, political instability, 
mismanagement, lagging private-sector investment, and 
low foreign participation in Iran’s oil sector limited the 
benefit of  these reforms.  Some attempts were made to 
reform Iran’s cumbersome bureaucratic structure and to
IRAN’S OIL AND GAS SECTOR
Figure 1: Iranian Oil Production, 1965–2013   
              (In millions of  barrels per day)

























































































IMPLICATIONS OF SUSTAINED LOW OIL PRICES ON IRAN
6 |  CENTER ON GLObAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMbIA SIPA
As Figure 1 shows, Iran was able to achieve some recovery 
following the end of  the war with Iraq and throughout 
the 1990s with the reforms undertaken by then-president 
Rafsanjani that loosened restrictions on foreign access to and 
profits from Iran’s oil industry. Still, relatively low oil prices 
in the 1990s, political instability, mismanagement, lagging 
private-sector investment, and low foreign participation 
in Iran’s oil sector limited the benefit of  these reforms.¹ 
Some attempts were made to reform Iran’s cumbersome 
bureaucratic structure and to offer foreign companies 
ways to invest in Iran’s oil sector in a fashion consistent 
with the constitution through new contract structures. 
These included “buyback” contracts that offered service 
contracts to international oil companies for their work on 
Iran’s fields and an agreed rate of  return but still lacked the 
more attractive upsides available in other countries. But the 
overall complexity of  operating in a revolutionary country 
with an intensely anti-Western posture played a substantial 
role in deterring investment. After US sanctions were 
announced in 1996 to target foreign investment in Iran’s oil 
and gas sector, some firms were also deterred by the threat 
of  exclusion from the US market. However, throughout the 
2000s, major energy firms in Europe and Asia sought and 
performed contracts in support of  Iran’s oil and gas sector, 
intended to repair and stabilize damaged oil fields and 
improve their productivity, while at the same time exploring 
and developing new sites.
However, intensified US, European, Japanese, and Korean 
sanctions in 2010 undermined these developments, and with 
the imposition of  new sanctions in January 2012 targeting 
Iran’s Central Bank and, by extension, Iran’s oil exports, oil 
production has dropped to levels not seen since during the 
Iran-Iraq war. 
Natural gas, for its part, is an increasingly important 
element of  Iran’s economy, but its benefits have yet to be 
fully exploited because of  the high consumption of  natural 
gas domestically and weak infrastructure to transport it 
abroad. Iran operates pipelines for the sale of  natural 
gas to Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, but the latter 
two customers operate on the basis of  natural-gas swaps 
(whereby Iran agrees to sell natural gas to Azerbaijan and 
Armenia in exchange for purchasing the same amount from 
them as a way of  dealing with incomplete infrastructure in 
the northwest portion of  Iran). Despite holding the world’s 
second-largest natural-gas reserves after Russia, Iran has 
been thwarted in its goals to expand production and sales of  
gas by sanctions that impede its ability to develop pipelines 
with its neighbors or liquefied–natural gas plants.
IMPLICATIONS OF SUSTAINED LOW OIL PRICES ON IRAN
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Figure 2: Inflation and the Exchange Rate
Rials/$
Source: Central Bank of Iran. Inflation is a twelve-month moving average, and the exchange rate is the 
free-market rate.
IMPACT OF OIL SANCTIONS
As noted previously, sanctions have impaired Iran’s oil 
sector since 1996. However, the overall impact on Iran’s 
economy of  sanctions targeting the oil sector was more 
a long-term problem to be managed and countered than 
an immediate threat prior to US and European efforts 
to reduce Iran’s oil exports significantly beginning 
in January 2012. Europe’s decision to cut off  all 
purchases of  Iranian crude oil, refined petroleum, and 
petrochemicals cost Iran 25 percent of  its oil sales at 
that point. Similar decisions on the part of  four other 
purchasers to reduce their purchases to zero, combined 
with reductions on the part of  the remaining six, cut 
Iran’s sales from around 2.5 million bpd in 2011 to 
between 1 and 1.1 million bpd at the end of  2013. 
The loss of  this revenue damaged the overall economy 
and undermined ongoing attempts to improve it, 
such as subsidy reform. However, the combination 
of  lower sales and the February 2013 imposition of  
new restrictions on foreign banks receiving Iran’s oil 
revenues proved catastrophic. From that point forward, 
though Iran could still sell oil to the six remaining 
customers, it was prohibited from repatriating its oil 
proceeds or using them in anything other than strictly 
bilateral or humanitarian trade. This was achieved 
through a new US law—the Iran Threat Reduction Act 
and Syria Human Rights Act of  2012—which stipulated 
that, as of  February 6, 2013, any financial institution 
that conducts transactions on the part of  the Central 
Bank of  Iran (CBI) would be prohibited from holding 
or opening correspondent relationships with US 
financial institutions. The only exceptions granted were 
transactions involving humanitarian or strictly bilateral 
trade. The end result is that Iran, caught off  guard by 
the adherence of  foreign banks to the sanctions imposed 
by the United States, lost the ability to utilize a large—
and growing—portion of  its national reserves, which 
became informally restricted from that point forward.
Naturally, the loss of  most of  Iran’s oil revenue and 
access to the rest contributed to a shortfall in Iran’s 
national budget, with a resulting drain in Iran’s ability 
to engage in a variety of  national projects, such as 
infrastructure development, subsidies for other export 
industries (such as the auto sector), and even subsidy 
payments for individual Iranians. Iran’s currency—the 
rial—was also put under severe stress. As confidence 
waned in Iran’s ability to weather the economic storm 
that sanctions intensified, so did confidence in the 
rial itself. Iranians began to seek alternative stores of  
currency, purchasing gold and hard currency in order to 
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depreciation of  the rial, and contributed to what came to 
be seen as, in effect, a run on the rial in October 2012. 
In just one day alone, October 1, the rial lost 15 percent 
of  its value. 
As a direct consequence of  these sanctions, Iran’s 
economy experienced a significant downturn in 2012 
and 2013. According to the Central Bank of  Iran, GDP 
in 2013 was 9 percent below its value in 2010.²
IMPLICATIONS OF SUSTAINED LOW OIL PRICES ON IRAN
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ADJUSTING TO LOWER OIL REVENUES
The standard textbook analysis of  economic adjustment 
to a decline in export earnings begins with the depreciation 
of  the country’s exchange rate. This, in turn, affects 
relative prices in the local economy, which help to boost 
exports and limit imports. The result is that resources are 
pulled from domestic consumption and redirected into 
export sectors, hopefully restoring a semblance of  the 
balance lost when export earnings declined in the first 
place. 
This mechanism does not work well in Iran’s case for two 
reasons: 
1.   Iran’s exports are mostly based on hydrocarbons—
crude oil and petrochemicals—that do not use 
many local resources that can be diverted. In 
other words, their supply is inelastic and does not 
respond to the stimulus of  devaluation. In 2013, 
following the 200 percent devaluation of  the 
rial in 2012 (Figure 2), oil exports actually fell 5 
percent and nonoil exports (mostly hydrocarbon-
based petrochemicals) rose by 6.4 percent.
2.   Iran’s economy is not very flexible. Markets play 
an important role, but government interventions 
supersede market signals at crucial junctions. The 
most important is the exchange rate itself. As 
the main earner of  foreign exchange due to the 
Iranian constitutional restriction on who owns 
and can sell Iran’s oil, the government plays a large 
role in the determination of  the exchange rate. 
Government control over the exchange rate allows 
political influences to blunt this important tool 
for adjustment to lower oil revenues. During the 
Ahmadinejad administration (2005–2013), due to 
a combination of  high oil prices, low exchange 
rates, and a desire for foreign imports within the 
population, cheap imports flooded the Iranian 
market and weakened the country’s industrial base. 
The exchange rate remained fairly stable during a 
decade-long oil boom (2002–2011), while prices 
for goods in Iran increased three times faster than 
did prices in the United States and other OECD 
countries. The disparity of  the dual exchange rate 
that developed both served a political purpose for 
Iran’s government, which took some pride in a 
strong currency, and enabled profiteering by some 
in the government and security forces who were 
able to import goods at the official rate and sell 
them at the real one. 
As noted, this changed significantly with the tightening 
of  international sanctions in 2011–2012 and the 
resulting drop in the value of  the rial. Although the 
large adjustment in the exchange rate was a huge shock 
to Iran’s economy, it did help correct some of  the worst 
distortions, in part by eliminating the opportunity for the 
aforementioned profiteering and creating an incentive 
for domestic manufacturers of  goods that Iran might 
have otherwise imported. It also created an opportunity 
for Iranian manufacturers to export goods that had not 
traditionally been part of  Iran’s modern trade, such as 
cement. Unfortunately for Iran, though, the relative price 
corrections were insufficient to bring about an orderly 
economic adjustment to lower oil revenues. In addition 
to a lack of  responsiveness of  oil exports to the exchange 
rate, the large role of  the  state in the economy prevented 
some key prices, such as energy, food, and medicine, from 
adjusting, and—in doing so—redirected more resources 
toward exports. 
More importantly, restriction on Iran’s access to global 
trade made it difficult for the economy to adjust. Iranian 
agricultural and industrial production relies heavily on 
imported inputs. Though these items may be modest in 
value relative to a sector’s value added, they are often 
critical inputs in production. Sanctions inhibited, and 
continue to inhibit, Iranian producers’ access to a wide 
range of  technologies that enable them to reorient their 
production toward exports, deepening Iran’s import 
dependence. Similarly, in the medium and long terms, 
adjustment requires changes in production technology, 
which require access to global markets and normal 
financial relationships, such as the availability of  letters of  
credit to conduct trade. These were curtailed by sanctions 
as well. 
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PRESIDENT ROUHANI’S EFFORTS SINCE JUNE 
The year 2013 was, therefore, critical for Iran and its 
ability to manage the constraints placed upon it. Iran’s 
economy was placed front and center in the presidential 
campaigns that took place in the first half  of  the year, 
culminating with the election of  the candidate who laid 
out a clear path for improving the state of  the Iranian 
economy, starting with seeking the lifting of  sanctions: 
Hassan Rouhani.
Upon taking office, Rouhani would have liked to pursue 
a stimulus program for the economy and to reduce 
unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, which 
had been over 20 percent for more than a decade. However, 
with inflation topping 30 percent for two consecutive 
years, in 2012 and 2013, containing inflation became 
his first priority. Rouhani had little choice but to follow 
tight fiscal and monetary policies to rein in inflation. This 
meant that he had to forego development expenditures, 
which are historically the impetus for private-sector 
investment and economic growth. As a result, they fell by 
two-thirds in 2012–2013 compared to prior years. On the 
positive side for Iran, Rouhani achieved lower inflation in 
2014 as a result of  these efforts, with rates less than half  
of  the 40 percent mark reached in 2012 (Figure 2). 
Rouhani also took painful steps to reduce government 
expenditures by dealing with two large programs inherited 
from his free-spending predecessor that placed heavy 
burdens on the government budget and banking system: 
the subsidy-reform program and a low cost–housing 
scheme known as Maskan Mehr.
•   The subsidy-reform program was intended to deal 
with the distortions created in Iran’s economy by 
a long history of  artificially low food and energy 
prices by turning the program into a direct social-
assistance effort for Iran’s poorest citizens. The 
program involves letting prices on food and energy 
rise but compensating for the resulting impact on 
the poor by creating a direct cash-transfer program. 
The energy aspect of  the program was also 
intended to deal with the impact of  international 
sanctions, particularly on gasoline. Before gasoline 
sanctions in 2010, Iran imported about one-third 
of  its gasoline consumption, and although it was 
then the third largest producer of  natural gas 
in the world, Iran was a net importer of  natural 
gas due to wasteful consumption at home. Iran 
remains a net importer of  natural gas, but has—
by necessity—trimmed its imports of  gasoline. 
 
Well intended but not well executed, the program 
had stalled at the end of  the Ahmadinejad era with 
prices still artificially low and direct transfers not fully 
funded. In 2013, the program’s deficit amounted 
to more than 100 trillion rials ($3 billion), about 8 
percent of  total government expenditures. During 
his first year, President Rouhani all but eliminated 
this deficit by increasing prices of  subsidized 
goods by 30–50 percent. However, political and 
legal considerations, as well as economic need, 
demanded that the subsidy program remain in 
effect. His government continues to honor the 
monthly cash transfer of  about $15 per person per 
month, for a total of  420 trillion rials ($14 billion) 
per year. Similarly, with respect to energy, the 
price increases since 2010 have been in large part 
eroded by subsequent inflation. Since taking office, 
Rouhani has raised energy prices once, by about 
one-third, which leaves Iranian energy prices still 
below the global market and far below prices in 
neighboring countries. 
•   The low-cost housing scheme known as Maskan 
Mehr, which started in 2006, was not directly 
funded from the public purse but placed a heavy 
burden on the banking system and eventually the 
Central Bank, which printed money to cover the 
program’s shortfalls. Rouhani practically stopped 
this program, with hundreds of  thousands of  
apartments half-complete, in order to stop the 
financial bleeding from what had become an overly 
expensive project. 
Still, Rouhani and his advisors concluded upon his 
election that only through relief  from sanctions would 
Iran be able to reverse its current course. The Iranian 
government began to meet secretly with the United States 
in August 2013 to see whether a diplomatic solution to 
the nuclear standoff  could be achieved.
The JPOA reached by the P5+1 and Iran in November 
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2013 eased the constraints on Iran to a modest degree. 
Pursuant to the JPOA, Iran was permitted to gain 
access to $700 million per month of  its “restrained” 
oil revenues. However, at the time in which the JPOA 
was concluded, this was only approximately 23 percent 
of  the total monthly revenue of  its much-diminished oil 
sales. (At $100/barrel, Iran was estimated to be selling 
approximately $3 billion a month of  oil.) Iran would 
still be permitted to use the remaining balances for 
humanitarian or bilateral trade with its six remaining oil 
customers, but with the expectation that—as with the 
previous two years—these purchases would be less than 
the total amount of  Iranian oil revenue and that restricted 
balances would continue to rise.³
However, one curious effect of  the sanctions is that the 
restrictions on Iranian oil revenues also insulated Iran 
somewhat from the impact of  the sudden decrease in oil 
prices since mid-2014. The sanctions imposed on Iran 
sharply curtailed the purposes to which its oil proceeds 
could be applied. As a consequence, when oil prices 
dropped, the incremental shock to Iran’s revenue stream 
was relatively small: in effect, the price drop and resulting 
shock had already occurred to Iran three years before. The 
drop in oil prices, therefore, represented a second, smaller 
shock to the Iranian system. Iran had already begun to 
adjust its government-budgeting process to account for 
less oil being sold even prior to the drop in oil prices in 
mid-2014. Rouhani’s budget proposal of  December 2013 
set oil’s price at $100 per barrel, even as oil was trading 
at $110, and assumed that only 1.1 million bpd would 
be sold.� This step reflected the Rouhani administration’s 
recognition that sanctions were affecting the price of  
Iranian oil and that increasing its sale of  oil would not 
be plausible in the international-sanctions environment. 
It followed previous President Ahmadinejad’s budget 
estimate for 2013–2014 of  $91 per barrel, even as oil was 
trading at $102, with exports of  1.3 million bpd. 
The budget response to dropping oil revenues was swift 
and began before Rouhani took office (see Table 1). Real 
government expenditures were reduced by 32 percent 
in 2012 compared to 2011, with a much sharper decline 
in real development expenditures (60 percent). This 
decrease was sharper than the economy-wide adjustment 
as manifested in the 15 percent drop in imports. 
Rouhani’s first budget for 2013 remained highly 
contractionary, though development expenditures 
increased by 7 percent in real terms. His proposed budget 
for 2014, reflecting the gains from the JPOA, envisaged 
a 20 percent increase, most of  it in development 
expenditures. 
Certainly, it is true that a further reduction in oil revenues, 
caused by the halving of  oil prices, would complicate 
Iranian budgeting. However, the scope and scale of  
the problem was less than in previous years. By having 
already absorbed the reality of  lower oil sales at lower 
prices, Iran’s government acknowledged the reduced role 
of  oil exports in national-revenue generation. Addressing 
a budgetary impact of  now-lower oil prices required Iran 
to reduce its estimate of  oil prices to $40 per barrel for 
2015–2016, but the absolute value of  the loss to revenue 
was far less in 2015 than in 2013. 
Table 1: Percent change in real public expenditures 
 
Source: The Central Bank of Iran.
Year Total Current Development
1391 (2012-2013) -31.5 -22.3 -59.6
1392 (2013-2014) 0.9 -0.2 7.3
1393 (2014-2015) 20.3 11.6 67.6
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The last few years have put Iran well behind its own goals 
as envisaged in the twenty-year strategic plan issued as a 
decree in 2005. Even growing at the East Asian rates of  8 
percent per year would not be enough to fulfill the plan’s 
lofty goals. But growth at more than 5 percent would at 
least begin to reduce unemployment and with luck bring 
the unemployment rate for youth to single digits. Much 
more than high oil prices is needed to grow at rates higher 
than 5 percent, including: 
•   Investment in infrastructure: Iran has a decent 
infrastructure of  roads, transportation, and ports, 
and its supply infrastructure for electricity and 
natural gas domestically is well developed. The 
weakest part of  Iran’s infrastructure is its access to 
the Internet, though at this point the impediments 
to raising Internet speed and accessibility are 
primarily legal and ideological rather than financial. 
•   Privatization: The government owns and operates 
some 50 percent of  Iran’s enterprises. Instead of  
leading enterprises to pull the rest of  the economy 
forward, the government’s enterprises are a heavy 
drain on public resources and a drag on private 
investment. Attempts to privatize in the last two 
decades have been one failure after another, from 
sham privatization—selling large enterprises to 
government-owned banks—to sales of  valuable 
enterprises to cronies at cut rates, to enterprises 
that no one wants to buy. Rouhani’s economic 
team is working on a new model of  privatization, 
but it is hampered by a weak private sector more 
interested in trade than production and more prone 
to seek rents than profits. 
•   Improving the business climate: Business climate 
is a buzzword that is repeated in Iran’s media, 
but little action has been taken to improve it. For 
example, Iran’s legal system still operates with some 
uncertainty, which stymies domestic business and 
would also interfere with international investment. 
• Corruption: Rouhani has made countering 
corruption a signature cause, but this effort 
has shades of  political maneuvering due to the 
widespread belief  that hard-line elements—
including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC)—are the primary beneficiaries of  
corruption. 
For a country with the ambitious development goals that 
Iran has, as well as its pressing needs, lower oil prices for 
a long period of  time would have a major, systemic effect 
on the country and its future development. 
The price impact on Iran is more severe in the long 
term than in the short term. Table 2 bears out the lost 
economic opportunity created by a long period of  lower 
prices when set against Iran’s current and possible future 
oil-export potential: 
Table 2: Comparing the Income Effect of  Oil Price Versus Oil Reductions
 
Source: Author calculations.




$40 million $60 million $80 million $100 million
1.25 million b/d $25 million $50 million $75 million $100 million $125 million
1.5 million b/d $30 million $60 million $90 million $120 million $150 million
1.75 million b/d $35 million $70 million $105 million $140 million $175 million
2 million b/d $40 million $80 million $120 million $160 million $200 million
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LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE OF IRANIAN POLICY
Rouhani owes his decisive election victory to his promises 
of  reversing the populist policies of  the Ahmadinejad 
administration and reviving Iran’s stagnating economy. 
He has done much to make good on the first promise, 
but he is far from achieving the second. He must have 
known from the start that his winning card for economic 
revival—repairing relations with the West and ending the 
sanctions—was not a sure bet. But with oil prices in the 
$100 range, even a modest easing of  the sanctions would 
have given enough of  a boost to turn the economy around. 
Now, after the collapse in oil prices and with no sign of  
returning to the previous $100-per-barrel level, ending 
the sanctions must take a greater urgency if  President 
Rouhani is to convince voters that he can deliver. With 
parliamentary elections less than a year away (February 
26, 2016) and his own reelection two years from now, the 
political clock is ticking fast.
The two largest unknowns at the time of  this writing are 
the fate of  the negotiations and the future of  the price 
of  oil. As with the causes of  Iran’s current economic 
slump, Iran’s recovery depends more on the outcome of  
the negotiations (and the future of  sanctions) than on 
the price of  oil. This paper has shown how the impact 
of  sanctions has impeded Rouhani’s efforts to improve 
the economy through normal mechanisms. His ability 
to make further use of  these tools will be hindered if  
sanctions remain in place. For example, the option to cut 
expenditures further (mostly development expenditures) 
is not realistic given the deep cuts that have come already 
and because it would be inconsistent with Rouhani’s 
promise of  economic recovery. Similarly, efforts to cut 
people from subsidy rolls have been hindered by the 
political nature of  such a decision and claims that doing 
so would undermine growth. Boosting government 
revenues through tax reform and stopping tax evasion 
have also been part of  Rouhani’s effort but have only 
improved the situation marginally. Rouhani needs full 
access and use of  Iran’s economy—which can only come 
with sanctions relief—to make good on this promise. 
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IF SANCTIONS ARE RELIEVED
If  there is a deal and sanctions relief  is manifest, then 
continued low oil prices would put pressure on Rouhani’s 
government from two directions: it must find a way to 
balance its budget and spend enough on investment to 
get the economy going. It is in part for this reason that 
Rouhani is working to address bureaucratic problems and 
improve the investment climate for foreign companies so 
that they can inject more money into the country.
Iran’s dependence on oil revenues for its budget is 
high, but it is lower than countries of  the Persian Gulf  
or Venezuela. About a decade ago, close to two-thirds 
of  Iran’s government revenues came from oil exports. 
Today, and since the last Ahmadinejad budget proposal, 
the figure is down to less than 40 percent. As such, Iran 
is not as dependent as other countries on shoring up 
the price of  oil to create balance in its budget, though 
naturally collecting more revenues from the sale would 
make this task easier.
This points to an interesting opportunity for Rouhani 
to change the manner in which the Iranian government 
gains revenue from oil sales: collecting from internal oil 
sales. The government of  Iran sells roughly 4 million 
bpd of  oil equivalent, between oil and natural gas, to its 
domestic customers compared to the 1 to 1.5 million 
bpd that it exports. However, the Iranian budget only 
accounts for revenues from oil exports, not total oil 
production and sales that include the domestic market 
(aside from as an input into petrochemical production). 
For political reasons, it was useful to the government 
to only account for oil sold abroad and to not generate 
revenue from domestic consumption. Historically, this 
was agreeable, because until domestic consumption 
surged in the last several years, oil exports accounted for 
three times as much as domestic consumption. Inside of  
Iran, prices of  energy products barely covered the cost 
of  their distribution. After the huge price hikes of  2010’s 
subsidy reform and the smaller adjustment in 2014, the 
revenues from domestic sales still only cover the cash 
transfers paid to Iranian families as compensation for the 
first price increase. 
Today, further increases in energy prices, though 
highly unpopular, remain a viable option for Rouhani’s 
government. In principle, government oil revenues 
should come from the sale of  all energy products, not 
just crude oil sold abroad. Domestic pricing policies may 
change, however, once the country faces squarely the 
choice between growing the economy and growing energy 
consumption: raise energy prices, or let development 
projects go unfunded. The potential earnings from the oil 
and gas sold domestically cannot only replace the shortfall 
of  revenues from oil exports due to lower oil prices; they 
can also finance an expanded public-investment program.
Raising energy prices is a politically risky move, especially 
if  it is taken without an increase in the amount of  cash 
transfers to compensate poorer consumers for the 
rise in prices. Here, Rouhani’s government is in a real 
bind, because it has rejected the idea of  increasing 
cash transfers. It is, in fact, under great pressure from 
the parliament and the wider public to take the wealthy 
Iranians off  the roll. So far, it has resisted such a move 
because it does not have sufficient information on 
household income and wealth and is, therefore, unable to 
make a clean distinction between the haves and the have-
nots. But there are also signs—including an open letter 
published in May 2015 by Rouhani’s minister of  labor 
and social welfare—that this is on the table.
For these reasons, as well as the current lower oil-price 
environment, the proposed budget for this year (2015–
2016) does not foresee any increase in energy prices or in 
cash transfers. The government is expecting to increase 
next year’s development budget by two-thirds in real 
terms and is evidently planning to find the money to do 
so from taxes.
This level of  increase in public investment is likely 
enough to keep the economy growing at 2–3 percent 
per year if  sanctions ease significantly. But reaching a 
growth rate of  more than 5 percent to start making a 
dent in unemployment is not possible without substantial 
recovery of  oil prices and, of  course, sanctions relief.
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IF SANCTIONS REMAIN
For the economy as a whole, replacing lost oil revenues is 
much more difficult and would depend greatly on Iran’s 
ability to access the global financial and trading system. 
Absent a comprehensive nuclear agreement, sanctions 
would likely tighten on Iran. This would make it hard to 
maintain the positive-expectations equilibrium that has 
allowed the economy to grow by about 3 percent since 
Rouhani took office. In addition, as noted earlier, the 
ability of  Iranian producers to obtain new technologies 
and source critical input would be limited, resulting in 
further economic contraction. 
In such a scenario, the value of  the rial, which has 
remarkably stayed constant in the last two years, would 
drop. In the last two years, capital flight has been kept in 
check (or may have even reversed) thanks to a combination 
of  high expectations in Iran for a compromise at the 
nuclear table, high interest rates, and natural fear about 
the loss of  access to capital held abroad in the future. 
After being in the negative range for several years during 
the Ahmadinejad era, interest rates are now some of  the 
highest in the world, about 7 percent in real terms. 
This would be followed by a surge in inflation in response 
to the falling rial, dampening any hope of  raising energy 
prices and, with it, the ability to balance the budget. 
Government investment expenditures would likely 
be the first cut, which would hurt the incentives of  
private investors, domestic or international. This would, 
naturally, prevent Rouhani from sustaining his efforts to 
improve national infrastructure, building new plants for 
the more efficient use of  Iran’s natural resources, and, 
more generally, speeding the pace of  Iran’s economic 
development. Under these scenarios, it is hard to imagine 
any new source of  growth in the short run. In the 
medium to long run, Iran could grow its economy, but 
it would have to reinvent its industrial economic base to 
produce a more limited range of  goods, particularly those 
it could produce without assistance from existing foreign 
suppliers. 
In the no-deal scenario, higher oil prices would be 
somewhat beneficial if  Iran could use its increased foreign-
exchange earnings to continue trade at the margins of  
the world economy, where sanctions might not reach. 
Iran could perhaps continue to grow at 2 or 3 percent 
with the combined effect of  such trade and higher oil 
prices, particularly if  sanctions both forced and allowed 
Iran to slowly disengage its industrial production from 
the grip of  Western technology to become more self-
sufficient in intermediate inputs it currently imports as 
well as in machinery used in capital formation. However, 
sanctions could also be targeted at such marginal trade 
and at denying Iran the inputs it still needs to support 
these industries. In such a scenario, it is hard to predict 
the implications in specific growth terms, but it would 
be implausible to expect sustained and strong positive 
growth in Iran as a result. 
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CONCLUSION
The impact of  the oil price drop on Iran is distinctly 
different from that felt by other major oil producers 
because of  the impact of  sanctions. As such, Iran 
experienced some of  the effects of  the price drop 
almost three years ago, which are only now becoming 
problems for other oil-producing states, and has taken 
steps to address them. Both reduced export volumes 
under sanctions and low oil prices cripple foreign-
exchange revenues, but sanctions are more damaging to 
the economy because they reduce Iran’s ability to spend 
its foreign-exchange earnings effectively and to import 
technologies that help the economy adjust to lower oil 
prices. 
President Rouhani has called for reforms of  national 
budgets and infrastructure priorities, in part as a response 
to the economic impact of  oil sanctions. But, ultimately, 
while he has rationalized some of  Iran’s economic 
decisions, absent sanctions relief, his ability to restore the 
Iranian economy will be seriously curtailed. Increased oil 
prices would help the Iranian economy more generally to 
compensate for the problems created by sanctions but 
would not be sufficient to solve the system’s problems 
without major, long-term retooling of  the Iranian 
economy, something hard to achieve without access to 
oil revenues in the first place.
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The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The first barrels of crude 
shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into tankers 
in May 2014. Threats of legal action by Iraq’s central 
government have reportedly held back buyers to take 
delivery of the cargoes so far. The pipeline can currently 
operate at a capacity of 300,000 b/d, but the Kurdish 
government plans to eventually ramp-up its capacity to 1 
million b/d, as Kurdish oil production increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 
